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Namibia: The Road to Independence 
and the Problem of Succession of St ates 
Lynn Berat 
Yale University 
Introduction 
After more than a century of colonial rule. the dream of 
independence long cherished by the vast majority of Namibians 
will soon become a reality. The road from freedom to subjugation 
and back again has been a long and tortuous one. Declared a 
protectorate by Germany late in the nineteenth century, Na-
mibia. then known as South West Africa. endured some thirty 
years of one of the most brutal colonial regimes in Africa. Invaded 
by South Africa on behalf of the Allied and Associated Powers in 
world War I. after the War South West Africa became a League 
of Nations mandate administered by South Africa on behalf of the 
British Empire. South African rule proved no better than that of 
Germany and South Africa treated the mandate as a thinly veiled 
annexation . 
The post-World War II years brought a new world order, 
one in which self -determination became firmly entrenched in the 
international jurisprudential corpus . As colonial empires were 
dismantled around the world, South Africa clung tenaciously to 
South West Africa. Much wrangling over the issue of Namibian 
independence between South Africa and the United Nations 
eventually resulted in the world body's terminating the mandate. 
Nevertheless. South Africa continued its occupation tn defiance 
of the wishes of the international community and international 
law. Although this prevented the United Nations from assuming 
its duties in the territory, the United Nations created a Council 
for Namibia to act as the legal government of Namibia in 
tnternational fora. Thereafter, the South West Africa People's 
Organization (SWAPO). which had been founded tn 1960 to 
oppose conttnued South African occupation, gained United 
Nations recognition as the official representative of the Namibian 
people. As a result of Namibia's unique legal status as a ward of 
the United Nations, SWAPO never declared itself a government-
In-exile, pref erring instead to work closely with the Council on 
Namibian matters and accepttng observer status in many inter-
national bodies. 
Then a December 1988 accord put a long-derailed U.N. 
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plan for Namibian independence back on track. The result of 
many factors, including super power politics, the independence 
process began on April 1. 1989, with elections set for November 
1. Despite much obfuscation by the South Africans, political 
wheeling and dealing was in full swing by mid - 1989. SWAPO, 
while perhaps not able to win the majority of the votes needed for 
it alone to form a government under the U.N. plan, was thought 
likely to garner enough support to make it a major player in any 
new Namibian government. Regardless of the outcome of the 
elections, the future government of Namibia will be faced with 
numerous social. economic, and legal problems . Prime among 
these will be the problem of succession of states, i.e . the issue of 
which legal obligations the government of a newly -independent 
Namibia will inherit. This article will examine Namibia's long 
journey from colonial rule to independence. Part I will discuss the 
history of its unique legal status and the role of the exiled SW APO 
as a major actor in the struggle for independence. Part II will 
consider the problem of succession of states and offer sugges-
tions as to the most prudent path for any new government to 
take. 
Namibian Independence 
Colonialism and the League of Nations 
In 1978. the captain of a British warship took posses-
sions of the southwest African port of Walvis Bay and its 
hinterland for the British Crown. 1 Six years later, after trying in 
vain to persuade the British Government to claim all of what is 
today Namibia, the Cape Colony, acting under Letters Patent 
issued by Queen Victoria, annexed the port and settlement of 
Walvis Bay as well as the surrounding area, a total of 434 square 
miles .2 It did so only after Germany, in the same year, claimed the 
rest of South West Africa as a protectorate. Germany proved to 
be one of the most brutal overlords in the colonial world, 
adopting, for example, an extermination policy when the Herera 
people rose in revolt against German rule . 3 
South African forces occupied South West Africa during 
the First World War . After the War, according to the terms of 
Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany renounced its 
sovereignty over its South West African protectorate in favor of 
the Allied and Associated Powers which placed the territory 
under the mandate system of the League of Nations. The Union 
of South Africa administered the territory on behalf of the British 
Empire as a class C mandate. The mandate agreement permitted 
South Africa to administer the territory as "an integral portion" 
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of the Union, subject to a trust obligation to advance "to the 
utmost the matertal and moral well being and the social prog-
ress" of the area's indigenous inhabitants. 4 South Afrtca was also 
to submit an annual report to the League detailing its admini-
stration.5 However , the mandate agreement did not include 
Walvis Bay , the only significant port serving South West Afrtca. 
in the mandated territory. 6 
South Afrtca proceeded to treat the mandate as a veiled 
annexation. It continually took actions that implicitly asserted 
south Afrtcan sovereignty over the territory. In response. the 
Permanent Mandates Commission questioned the Union's be-
havior and each time Pretoria explained its actions away or 
backed down. The League also took South Afrtca to task over its 
bombing of civilians in the Bondelswarts Massacre (1922). the 
high mortality rate among diamond miners, the territortal debt 
structure, and vartous aspects of the mandatory's native policy.7 
The Permanent Mandates Commission had ineffectual 
supervisory powers . For example, by the time the League dis-
cussed them. actions were often faits accomplis. Afrtcans could 
not voice their complaints in person or through an agent while 
south Afrtca had a representative present at all discussions of 
the mandate 's affairs. However, even though the League was 
captive to western ethnocentrtsm, the Permanent Mandates 
Commission repeatedly rejected South Afrtca's requests for 
annexation of the territory. 
The United Nations and the International Court of Justice 
At the end of the Second World War. the United Nations 
replaced the defunct League. All mandated territortes were to 
come under the United Nations trusteeship system. At the first 
session of the General Assembly, South Afrtca sought to incor-
porate the territory . The Assembly rejected this suggestion and 
decided that South Afrtca should place the mandate under 
trusteeship . 8 At the time, there was much international pressure 
against Sou th Africa's incorporation of the territory including the 
lobbying efforts of the Fifth Pan -Afrtcan Congress held in Man-
chester in 1945. The Congress demanded the submission of the 
territory to trusteeship and called for an investigation into the 
civil and political rights of the territory's indigenous inhabitants. 
Despite the international pressure, South Af rtca refused 
to comply with the General Assembly's request to submit the 
territory to trusteeship. Its representative, however, promised 
that pending a settlement. South Afrtca would continue to 
administer the territory "in the spirit of" the mandate. 9 Accord-
ingly, South Afrtca submitted one annual report on its admini-
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stration of the territory. The United Nations analysis of the 
report's contents was unfavorable to South Africa. In response tn 
1948, the newly-elected National Party government, which had 
campaigned with the slogan "apartheid," refused to submit any 
more reports. The new government also imposed South African 
citizenship upon all persons born in the territory and gave the 
territory's white residents representation in the Union Parlia-
ment. 
The General.Assemble and the Union Parliament reached 
no accord. Hence, in 1949, the General Assembly asked the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on the 
legal status of the territory. 10 The Court wrote that although there 
was no legal means of compelling South Africa to submit the 
territoryto trusteeship, the Un1oncould not un1laterally alter the 
territory's status without the General Assembly's concurrence. 
Thus, the mandate principles continued to apply to the territory 
while the supervision of its administration devolved upon the 
United Nations as the successor to the League. 11 
Various General Assembly resolutions urging submis-
sion to trusteeship proved ineffective. In 1954 12 and 1955 13the 
General Assembly agaain called upon the Court for guidance on 
its supervisory powers. South Africa ref used to accept any of the 
Court's opinions insofar as they restricted its administration of 
the territory. The General Assembly established a Committee to 
negotiate with South Africa on the matter but South Africa 
refused to cooperate. 
In 1957, the General Assembly established another 
committee to consider possible legal actions available to mem-
bers. The committee issued a report which was highly critical of 
the South African admin1stration of the territory. The report also 
recommended that member states invoke Article 7 of the man-
date agreement to enforce South Africa's obligation to promote 
the well being and development of the territory's indigenous 
inhabitants. According to the terms of Article 7, South Africa had 
agreed in advance to litigate in the International Court any 
unresolvable dlspu te referred to the Court involving the interpre-
tation or application of the mandate agreement. 14 
In 1960, two former League members, Liberia and Ethio-
pia, responded to a request from the General Assembly for a 
qualified state to bring suit against South Africa under Article 7. 
The complaint argued that South Africa had not complied with 
its obligation under the mandate agreement and called upon the 
Court to grant appropriate relief. 15 In 1962, the International 
Court ruled that the plaintiffs were legally entitled to pursue their 
claim. 16 Some of the judges including Spender of Australia and 
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Fitzmaurtce of Brttain, however, dissented. These two issued a 
Joint opinion. 
Four years later, the Court, instead of deciding the case 
on its mertts, issued a decision on what it termed an Mantecedent 
matter." 17 It held that the plaintiffs had no standing to brtng suit. 
The 1962 Joint dissenting opinion of the consetvative Australian 
and Brttishjudges became the 1966 majortty opinion by the tie-
breaking vote of the Australian who, as Judge President voted 
twice. This occurred because of the absence of three liberal 
judges from so called Third World countries. The need for 
Spender's tie-breaking vote arose from the death of Judge 
Badawi of Egypt and the absence of Judge Bustamante of Peru 
both of whom had both voted in favor of the plaintiffs in 1962. In 
the 1966 case, Judge Spender, without the consent of the rest of 
the Court, also disqualified Judge Zafrulah Khan of Pakistan on 
the ground that the plaintiffs had asked him to be their judge ad 
hoc even though he had not accepted the invitation. 18 
South Africa greeted the decision with jubilation. Indeed, cele-
brations began in that country immediately before the Court 
delivered its judgment. The United Nations response to the 
decision was to revoke the mandate in General Assembly Reso-
lution 2145 (XXI). It did so based upon its determination that 
South Afrtca's conduct amounted to a repudiation of the man-
date agreement. The General Assembly directed South Africa to 
end its occupation of the territory and appointed an ad hoc 
committee to recommend measures for its administration. In the 
sprtng of 1967, the United Nations set up an eleven member 
Council for Namibia under a Commissioner for Namibia to 
administer the territ _ory while preparing it for independence 
under the new con~titution which was to be drafted with popular 
participation. 19 However, South Afrtca made it impossible for the 
Council to assume its duties in the territory. 
Instead of withdrawing from the territory, South Africa 
intensified its efforts at annexation, following the recommenda-
tions of the Odendaal Plan. 20 This Plan, which was drafted in 
1962 -63 while the South West Afrtca cases were pending before 
the International Court of Justice, was designed to tum the 
territory into a fifth province of South Afrtca. For example, South 
Afrtca rescinded the limited home rule it had granted to South 
West African whites in 1925: it extended to the area its homeland 
policy according to which Afrtcans were divided into ethnic 
groups designated by the state ethnographer and relegated to 
lands which were supposedly their tribal domain; and it in-
creased its policy and military forces in the territory in an attempt 
to crush opposition to its rule from SWAPO which was founded 
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in 1960 to oppose South African domination. 21 
The Rise of SW APO 
Once great numbers of the Herero people met With 
disaster in the wake of a 1904 extermination order by a German 
General, many fled to Botswana, where they became the first 
South West African exiles . Eager to return to their homeland. in 
1947 they enlisted the help of an English clergyman the Rev. 
Michael Scott to mass evidence from their compatriots left 
behind and present it to the United Nations in an effort to 
convince that body that South Africa's desires to incorporate the 
territory were contrary to the Wishes of the indigenous inhabi-
tants . 22 At the same time, the seeds of political discontent were 
flowering among workers inside the country who opposed the 
inferior status to which their South African masters relegated 
them. 23 Their activities led to the formation in the 1950s of the 
Ovamboland People's Congress, later renamed the Ovambo 
People's Organization (OPO). In December, 1959, a peaceful 
protest in Windhoek, the territory's capital, against the forced 
removal of some Africans to a segregated township met With 
violence from the authorities . leaving twelve dead and forty five 
wounded. 24 The government then imprisoned or banished many 
of the organizers . Some, however, including young railway 
worker Sam Nujoma, escaped across the border in the second 
wave of exiles. 
In 1960, Nujoma and many of his compatriots clustered 
in Dar es Salaam which was then the nearest capital of an 
independent African state . Thereafter some of them appeared in 
New York where they petitioned the United Nations on behalf of 
those in their homeland. The exiles formed two groups, OPO, 
renamed SWAPO in 1960 With Nujoma as president and non-
aligned in orientation, and the South West African National 
Union (SW ANU). which had been founded in 1959 and reportedly 
had Maoist sympathies. In those heady days when anti-colonial 
fervor was sweeping much of the world, both groups received 
international recognition, particularly from the newly -independ-
ent states . 
The year 1964 brought a shift in SWAPO's fortunes . The 
Liberation Committee of the recently-formed Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) inquired as to whether each of the groups 
was willing to engage in the armed struggle against South African 
domination . SWAPO indicated that it was prepared to do so but 
SWANU refused With the result that the OAU thereafter backed 
SWAPO exclusively. 25 SWANU. which continues to exist. then 
became a minor player in the struggle for independence. SW APO 
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meanwhile. proceeded to grow in stature in the eyes of the 
international community . The 1965 General Conference of the 
sWAPO Executive Committee, held in Dar es Salaam, was partly 
responsible for this because it took steps to increase links with 
sWAPO compatriots in the country and to adopt a program for 
the most efficacious way of managing foreign financial contribu -
tions to its struggle. 26 In 1966 , after the ICJ's unsatisfactory 
decision in the case brought by Liberia and Ethiopia against 
south Africa, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PIAN), 
sWAPO's military wing, began the armed struggle. 27 As one 
SWAPO leader put it, M(w)e could secure our freedom only by 
fighting for it . M28 PIAN's activities met with swift and violent 
repression form the South Africans but tales of South African 
atrocities only increased the sympathy for SWAPO among the 
members of the international community. 
The Mandate Terminated and SWAPO's Struggle Trans-
formed 
In 1968. at SWAPO's request, the General Assembly 
changed the name of the territory from South West Africa to 
Namibia . Then, in 1969, the Security Council issued an ultima -
tum to South Africa demanding its withdrawal form the territory 
on October 4 of that year . The resolution noted that South Africa 
had committed Maggressive encroachment on the authority of the 
U.N., a violation of the territorial integrity and a denial of the 
political sovereignty of the people of Namibia. "29 Still South Africa 
remained . 
In 1970, the Security Council asked the International 
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the proper conduct 
of states in regard to the territory . 30 In its fourth advisory opinion 
relating to South West Africa/Namibia, the Court whose compo-
sition had changed since 1966, wrote that South Africa should 
withdraw its administration from the territory. Other states -
members and non-members of the United Nations- should treat 
South Africa's administration of the territory as illegal and refuse 
to recognize any actions taken by the South Africans for the 
territory. Moreover. the Court noted that to Mestablish ... and 
enforce distinctions. exclusions. restrictions, and limitations 
exclusively based on grounds of race, colour. descent or national 
or ethnic origin which constitute a denial offundamental human 
rights is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the 
(U.N.) Charter." 31 
In light of this opinion, the United Nations tried yet again 
to end South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory. From 
1971 to 1973 the Security Council passed several resolutions 
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calling upon states to take various actions to bring pressure on 
South Africa. In 1972, the Security Council sent the Secretary-
General on a mission to the territory but Namibia came no closer 
to independence. 
Meanwhile, the General Assembly concerned itself with 
actions it could take outside the territory. In 1971, it established 
the Fund for Namibia to assist refugees from the territory. Then, 
in 1973, it recognized SWAPO as the "authentic" representative 
of the Namibian people. 32 In 1974, it authorized a yearly sum for 
the maintenance ofa SWAPO office in New York. Two years later, 
it called SWAPO "the sole and authentic representative of the 
Namibian people" and gave it observer status at the United 
Nations. 33 This recognition of the legal status of a liberation 
movement reflected developments in the new international legal 
order of the last half of the twentieth century in which the rtght 
of self determination had become entrenched in theJus cogen.s, 
basic, fundamental, imperative or overriding rules of interna-
tional law, peremptory norms "which cannot be set aside by 
treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent 
norm of contrary effect. "34 
In 1974, Portuguese rule in Mozambique and Angola 
collapsed, transforming SW APO's struggle against South African 
domination. Psychologically, this raised hopes of independence 
among Namibians. Militarily, it enabled PLAN to operate along 
Namibia's northern border with Angola. As SWAPO's military 
fortunes grew, so did its political standing both within and 
without the territory. Numerically, SWAPO experienced a dra-
matic surge in membership in the first few months following 
Angolan independence when some 20,000 Namibians. the third 
major wave of exiles, crossed the border. Many of them made 
their way to Health and Education Centers which SWAPO had, 
by then established in Angola and Zambia. These centers, which 
included schools, clinics, and training in craft-making, won 
SWAPO further respect in international circles. In all, some 
80,000 exiled Namibians were thought to be in these SWAPO 
centers. a significant proportion of the total estimated Namibian 
population of 1.3 to 1.5 million. Still others went to Europe. the 
United States, Commonwealth countries, and elsewhere as 
students on United Nations or other scholarships. SWAPO's 
official presence around the world also expanded. A European 
office opened in the United Kingdom in 1969 and it oversaw 
relations with France, West Germany, Sweden, Romania, Yugo-
slavia, and East Germany. 35 It was followed by offices in New 
Delhi and Melbourne. Even as SWAPO's numbers in exile grew, 
the group continued to strengthen its ties within the country 
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where it received much support from the churches . 
In spite of its international recognition as the official 
representative of the Namibian people and its widespread inter-
nal support . never. however, did SWAPO declare itself a govern -
ment -in -exile. Recognizing Namibia's unique international legal 
status as a ward of the United Nations, SWAPO accepted the 
council for Namibia's role as the internationally-recognized 
government of Namibia until independence could occur . Accord-
ingly. working closely with the Council In many spheres. SW APO 
contented itself with observer status in various international fora 
where the Council took actions on Namibia 's behalf .36 
International Initiatives: The 1970s and 1980s 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s. the United Nations 
persisted in pressing for Namibian Independence and in taking 
actions meant to safeguard the rights of the Namibian people 
until emancipation arrived . In 1974, for example. the United 
Nations General Assembly which had just appointed its first full-
ume Commissioner for Namibia took various actions . It created 
the United Nations Institute for Namibia to give young Namibians 
the skills required to enable them to administer their country 
after independence. 37 The General Assembly also issued a decree 
aimed at protecting Namibia's interests by making it unlawful for 
companies to exploit or export any of Namibia's natural re -
sources without the authorization of the Council for Namibia . In 
addition, the decree provided for the seizure of the resources 
involved in case of contravention of Its terms and empowered the 
government of a future independent Namibia to sue offenders for 
dam ages. 38 
Also. in 1974, the Security Council passed Resolution 
366 which demanded that South Africa leave Namibia and 
threatened economic sanctions if that country did not comply. 
However, in exchange for the agreement of the western nations. 
the wording of the sanctions clause - weaker that in the draft 
version - failed to conform to the required formula under Chapter 
VU of the United Nations Charter. South Africa ignored the 
resolution. In response, the majority of the Security Council 
voted in favor of an arms embargo against Sou th Africa . The three 
western permanent members of the Council - the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and France - vetoed the measure. This was 
the first of what became known as the triple veto on Namibian 
issues . 
In mid-1975. South Africa sent troops to seize the Cal-
ueque power station on the Cunene River. which forms the 
border between Namibia and Angola. as well as strategic areas in 
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the vicinity. Within a few months it was negotiating with then 
United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to send troops 
north in collaboration with the pro-South African UNITA (Na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of Angola) movement led 
by Jonas Savimbi. At the same time. another Angolan faction the 
FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) aided by the 
C.I.A. was to attack yet another Angola faction, the MPLA 
(Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). form the 
Zairean border. The invading South Africans reachedjust to the 
south of the Angolan capital of Luanda but MPI.A forces backed 
by Cuban troops sent in at the MPlA's request drove the South 
Africans back into Namibia. 39 
At that time, the Security Council drafted a plan to 
remove South Africa from Namibia and to install a representativ e 
Namibian government. Lengthy negotiations ensued. In Janu-
ary. 1976. the Security Council adopted Resolution 395. This 
resolution provided that: 1) South Africa should abandon Na-
mibia at once and that the United Nations should temporaril y 
administer the area: 2) the United Nations should have ample 
time to prepare Namibia for an election in which all Namibian s 
would freely determine their own future: 3) an election should be 
held on a Namibia-wide basis "under United Nations supervisio n 
and control": and 4) in the period before South Africa transferre d 
power to the United Nations that country should abolish home-
lands and all discriminatory and repressive laws, release all 
political prisoners. permit all exiles to return safely, and grant 
full human rights to all. The resolution assumed that those 
Namibians elected in the United Nations-controlled election 
would draft a constitution under which Namibia would become 
· independent. The resolution listed August 31 as the deadline for 
South Africa's compliance. 40 
South Africa did not acquiesce and another triple veto 
saved it from a comprehensive arms embargo. Indeed. during the 
period from the end of Portuguese rule in Angola. South Africa 
increased repression in Namibia. It stringently enforced and 
expanded upon its homeland policy while at the same time 
offering to negotiate with United Nations officials. As the strength 
of the MPlA grew in Angola. South Africa resurrected an earlier 
plan to create a greater Ovamboland which was to include 
Ovambos from both sides of Namibia's northern border with 
Angola and function. with a pro South African leader. as a buffe r 
state between Namibia and Angola. The plan failed. 
In 1977 there was the formation of the so-called Western 
Contact Group under the leadership of the self-declared pro-
African administration of United States President Jimmy Carter. 
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The Contact Group consisted of the three permanent western 
members of the Security Council as well as Canada and West 
Germany then newly-elected non-permanent members of the 
council. Reacting to South Africa's failed Turnhalle Conference 
in Windhoek which was to have established a pro-SouthAfrican-
backed "Internal Parties", the five took it upon themselves to 
devise an "internationally acceptable solution" to the Namibian 
problem . 
In the midst of negotiations with the Contact Group 
concerning a possible settlement of the Namibian issue and an 
agreement for elections in the territory, the South African regime, 
anticipating the establishment of an independent Namibia, 
endeavored to solidify its position in the area. It appointed an 
Adminis trator -General for Namibia and vested plenary legisla-
tive and administrative power in him. 41 This action installed a 
"local" official of co equal status with any United Nations official 
who might oversee United Nations sponsored elections in Na-
mibia .42 
In addition, South Africa persisted with internal elections 
in December , 1978. Widely boycotted by SWAPO supporters, the 
elections were won by the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), 
a pro-South African party formed after the Turnhalle conference 
failed. The DTA formed an interim government which remained 
subordinate to the South West African administrator who had 
actual authority for the territory. The weak interim government 
collapsed in 1983 but it was resurrected in 1985 when it became 
a major player in another South African sponsored government, 
the Transitional Government of National Unity. 
Ever since South Africa flouted the United Nations inde -
pendence plan in 1978. the international body had been unable 
to induce South Africa to come to the bargaining table once more . 
Still South Africa continued to indicate a willingness to negotiate 
in what is best construed as a propaganda ploy to divert 
international attention from focussing on internal South African 
matters . Thus, in January, 1986, when South African President 
P.W. Both aannounced a willingness to negotiate on Namibian 
issues , he offered an August date for South African withdrawal 
from Namibia .43 This withdrawal was conditioned upon the exit 
of some 30,000 Cuban troops from Angola. The troops were there 
at the invitation of the Angolan government and assisted it in its 
struggle against the South African and United States backed 
guerilla forces of UNITA. The South African precondition for its 
departure from Namibia, known as linkage, was first insisted 
upon by United States Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs Chester Crocker in 1981 and was adopted unanimously 
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by the South Africans. 44 
In light of the linkage issue, the South African overture 
appears to have been disingenuous for at the time the speech was 
made, the Reagan Administration was courting Jonas Savimbi, 
the UNITA leader as an anti communist hero and offering him 
assistance in his efforts to overthrow the Angolan government. 
Such circumstances, of course made it impossible for the Ango-
lans to entertain any thought of removing the Cubana and 
precluded the possibility that negotiations regarding Namibian 
independence would occur. 
Meanwhile, the international press and the international 
community, perhaps tired of the failure of so many past at-
tempts, merely yawned . The deadline came and went without any 
developments . By that time, the international community was 
preoccupied with ending white minority rule in South Africa 
where growing black unrest and corresponding state repression 
had become a cause celebre among the international media. The 
Namibian issue thus disappeared from the cynosure. Its absence 
was not to be for long. 
By 1988 South Africa had entered a quieter phase. A 
nation-wide state of emergency declared in June 1986 and 
annually renewed had resulted, at least temporarily, in the 
quashing of black protest. Stringent censorship laws and the 
expulsion of many foreign journalists had succeeded in removing 
news of violent confrontation from the world's newspapers. radio 
broadcasts, and television screens . Nevertheless, by then the 
South African Economy was in shambles . Its military presence 
in Namibia and Angola was proving extremely costly both in 
human and monetary terms and a disastrous battle at Cuito 
Cuanavale in Angola at which a larger number of white South 
Afrtcans died had put South Afrtcan military superiority in 
doubt. At home, continued military Involvement was particularly 
unpopular with young white men who, by law, are bound to serve 
for two years in the South African armed forces. 45 The cost of 
running Namibia became a drain on the South African budget. 
In the international sphere, the superpowers were keen 
to reach some accord in southern Africa. In the age of glasnost 
and perestroika. Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was bent on 
ending his country's involvement in various regional conflicts 
around the world . Crocker of the United States was particularly 
keen to win a major policy victory in the area, his only one in 
nearly seven years. Angola, devastated by years of civil war 
wished to normalize relations with the United States and have a 
measure of stability. Cuba, too, had been sending signals to 
Washington indicating a desire for at least some thaw in rela-
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uons. 
The coalescence of these factors resulted in United 
states-brokered talks beginning in July 1988 among Cuba. 
Angola, and South Africa which eventually resulted in a time-
table for withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola acceptable to 
south Africa. and paved the way for the implementation of 
security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, the U.N. plan for 
Namibian independence. Not formally included in the talks was 
the Soviet Union which had observer status but which, repre-
sented by senior diplomat. Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly 
Adamishin. no doubt brought much pressure to bear on its 
Cuban and Angolan clients. Also absent was SWAPO which 
south Africa continued to refuse to recognize as having any 
special claim to represent the Namibian people. 
Finally. on December 22, 1988, an agreement was signed 
inNewYorkprovidingforthe implementation of the U.N. plan for 
u.N.-supervised elections leading to Namibian independence. 46 
Under the agreement. the process was to begin on April 1. 1989 
with the arrival of the United Nations Transitional Assistance 
group in Namibia. Elections for a Constituent Assembly which 
would draft a constitution were scheduled for November 1 with 
independence to follow early in 1990. Walvis Bay. Namibia's only 
port. was excluded from the independence plan. thus throwing 
open the door to continued South African military and economic 
domination of Namibia. 47 
The independence process did not begin smoothly; there 
were confrontations between SWAPO forces and South African 
troops which created an international brouhaha and saw South 
Africa threaten to withdraw from the agreement. Other difficul-
ties soon emerged including the use of violence and various 
intimidatory tactics by the South Africans who wished to dimin-
ish support for SW APO. 48 South Africa also took an interest in the 
activities of the various political parties which numbered more 
than thirty. By mid summer 1989, under a condition of the 
independence agreement. South Africa had granted amnesty to 
the exiles and large numbers ofSWAPO members. many of whom 
had been out of the country for nearly thirty years, were back in 
Namibia or on their way home. Observers believed that despite 
the South African animosity toward SWAPO, the group would 
garner the largest share of votes in the November 1 elections. 
thus assuring itself a place as a major actor in shaping the future 
of an independent Namibia. 
Namibia and the Problem of Succession of States 
45 
The Nature of the Problem 
Any new government that comes to power in Namibia, 
whether it is dominated by SWAPO or not. will be beset by myriad 
economic, social. and legal problems . It will inherit an economy 
in shambles. Namibia relies on the export of raw materials to a 
greater extent than perhaps any other country in the world. 49 In 
addition, its mineral wealth and major source of income has been 
exploited by multinational corporations concerned only with 
financial gain in violation of a United Nations decree prohibiting 
such practices. 50 Namibia's fishing industry has collapsed through 
over-exploitation and its only port, Walvis Bay, the center of the 
fishing industry and the place through which ninety percent of 
Namibia's exports pass will remain in South African hands after 
Namibian independence . 51 In social terms, the legacy of German 
and then South African occupation has been disastrous. The 
people, particularly in the north. where the majority of the 
population lives. have been ravaged by the effects of more than 
twenty years' war of liberation waged by SWAPO against the 
occupying South African forces. Governmental services such as 
health care and education remain woefully inadequate. 52 
On the legal front, the new Namibian government will be 
confronted with the problem of succession of states. i.e. "the legal 
consequences of a change of sovereignty over territory. "53 In this 
case, a question arises as to which of the rights and obligations 
of the "predecessor state" pass to the "successor state." Of 
particular relevance is the issue of which obligations regarding 
treaties and private property a freely-elected Namibian govern-
ment will assume upon independence. These become crucial 
decisions especially in a state confronted with dismal economic 
realities which. undoubtedly, will actively seek foreign invest-
ment and aid in an effort to develop. 
The dilemma facing the new Namibian government is the 
same as that described by former President Julius Nyerere of 
Tanzania who said, in 1961. when the independence of his 
country was imminent: 
The Government is naturally anxious that the 
emergence ofTanganyika as an independent State 
should in general cause as little disruption as 
possible to the relations which previously existed 
between foreign States and Tanganyika. At the 
same time, the Government must be vigilant to 
ensure that where international law does not 
require it, Tanganyika shall not in the future be 
bound by pre-independence commitments which 
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are no longer compatible with their new status 
and interest. 54 
Before the issues of succession raised by Nyerere can be 
addressed, however, it is imperative to examine the nature of the 
predecessor state from which will pass the rights and obligations 
that the new Namibian government will assume. 
The Issue of Sovereignty 
As indicated above, once Germany lost World War I, 
German South-West Africa became a Class C mandate under the 
League of Nations system and the Union of South Africa, now the 
Republic of South Africa, administered the mandated territory 
on behalf of the British Empire. 55 Although, this transfer of power 
ended German sovereignty over the area, it did not mean that 
sovereignty was vested in the League of Nations. The League was 
an international organization with certain international rights 
and duties. Its nature was, however, suigeneris, in the interna-
tional law of the day. It possessed none of the attributes of 
statehood , namely a permanent population. a defined territory, 
a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other 
States. 56 Accordingly, sovereignty over Namibia did not vest in 
the League, which. instead, had supervisory power over man-
dates. 
Sovereignty over South West Africa also did not vest in 
South Africa despite the expressed intention of South Africa to 
the contrary. From the start, South Africa treated the mandate 
as a veiled annexation. It continually took actions that asserted 
South African sovereignty over the territory. The Permanent 
Mandates Commission repeatedly rejected any act of suggestion 
that a mandatory had sovereignty over a mandated territory. For 
example, when the preamble to the 1926 Portuguese-South 
African treaty delimiting the boundary between South West 
Africa and Angola provided that "the Government of the Union of 
South Africa, subject to the terms of the said mandate, possesses 
sovereignty over the territory of South West Africa lately under 
the sovereignty of Germany. "57 the Commission objected. In a 
report to the League Council it indicated that 
(u)nder the circumstances, the Commission 
doubts whether such an expressionas "possesses 
sovereignty," used in the preamble to the above-
mentioned Agreement, even when limited by such 
a phrase as that used in the above-quoted pas-
sage, can be held to define correctly, having 
regard to the terms of the Covenant, the relations 
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existing between the mandatory power and the 
territory placed under its mandate. 58 
Subsequently, in 1927 and 1930, the Council passed resolutions 
stipulating that mandatory powers did not have sovereignty over 
their mandates. 
It would seem. then, that by default. sovereignty over 
South West Africa vested in the people themselves. This was not 
the case. In international practice. League of Nations mandates 
and later, in the early post World War II years, trust territories 
under the United Nations, were dependent territories and in 
terms of succession of states, they received the same treatment 
as colonies. Accordingly, they had no sovereignty before inde-
pendence . Sovereignty over South West Africa. therefore, re-
mained in suspension . This view was expressed by Lord McNair 
in his separate opinion in the International Court of Justice's 
1950 advisory opinion on the legal status of the territory. He 
wrote that "sovereignty over a Mandated Territory is in abeyance; 
if and when the inhabitants of the territory obtain recognition as 
an independent state. as has already happened in the case of 
some of the Mandates. sovereignty will revive and vest in the new 
state ."59 
Following this view. it would appear that a new Namibia 
will begin its life as a new state, a tabula rasa in international 
relations . However. it is more appropriate to argue that because 
of its peculiar international legal status prior to independence, 
the Council for Namibia must be deemed to be the predecessor 
state for some purposes. 
The Councll for Namibia as Predecessor State 
In October. 1966, after being rebuffed by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in a case brought by Liberia and Ethiopia, 
two former League members, alleging that South Africa had not 
complied with its obligations under the mandate agreement and 
calling upon the Court to grant appropriate relief, 60 the General 
Assembly terminated the South African mandate over Namibia. 61 
In 1969, the Security Council approved of the General Assembly's 
decision. 62 Meanwhtle, in 1967, the General Assembly had 
created tli.e United Nations Council for South West Africa, later 
renamed Namibia, composed of eleven member states and 
authorized it to: 1) administer South West Africa until independ-
ence with the maximum participation of the inhabitants; 2) 
promulgate legislation required for the administration of the 
Territory until a legislative assembly could be elected on the basis 
of universal adult suffrage; 3) take immediate measures. in 
consultation with the inhabitants. to establish a constitutional 
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assembly with the object of drawing up a constitutional assembly 
with the object of drawing up a constitution; 4) maintain law and 
order: and 5) transfer all powers to the people of the territory 
following the declaration of independence. 63 
While South African intransigence over the issue of 
Namibian independence has prohibited the Council from assum-
ing its responsibilities inside Namibia, it has represented Na-
mibia in an number of international organizations and in rela-
tions with various states. The Council enjoys a dual status as 
both an organ of the United Nations and as the legal administer-
ing authority for Namibia. It does so in accordance with relevant 
General Assembly resolutions and other United Nations pro-
nouncements. Most important of these is a General Assembly 
resolution of 1977 which specified the Council's tasks "as an 
organ of the United Nations" and "as the legal Administering 
Authority for Namibia. "64 That it remains subordinate to United 
Nations authority is indicated by the annual reports which it 
submits to the General Assembly regarding its activities and in 
which it requests General Assembly approval for its future 
endeavors. 65 
While the Council for Namibia. like the League of Nations, 
does not meet the requirements for statehood and therefore does 
not meet the criteria for membership in many international 
organizations, it has participated on behalf of Namibia as an 
observer without the right to vote in many such organizations. 
Examples include the United Nations Educational. Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO); the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO): the World Health Organization (WHO): and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Again, because of Namibia's peculiar international status, 
the Council for Namibia is not the only organization that has 
represented Namibian interests in international bodies. This 
function also has been performed by SWAPO which various 
United Nations 66 and Organization of African Unity67 resolutions 
have described as "the sole and authentic" representative of the 
"Namibian people. "The role ofSWAPO has not. however, caused 
difficulties in the international arena as a result of various 
General Assembly resolutions which call upon international 
organizations and conferences to permit the participation ofboth 
the Council for Namibia and SWAPO "when the rights and 
interests of Namibia are involved. "68 The Council's authority also 
seems to be superior to that of SWAPO both in terms of 
international practice and by SWAPO's own admission. For 
example, while both organizations have participated in the 
proceedings of organizations such as UNESCO, FAO, WHO, and 
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the ILO, in 1978 the ILO admitted Namibia as a full member 
represented by the Council; accordingly, SWAPO did not partici-
pate as a separate entity during the next annual ILO conference 
but instead some of its members were pat of the Council's 
delegation . 
That SWAPO accepts the Council's superiority as far as 
succession of states is concerned was made apparent at the 
1977 /78 United Nations Conference on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties. The SWAPO representative emphasized that 
"South Africa could not, therefore, be regarded as a predecessor 
State ofNamibia ... Only the United Nations Council for Namibia 
could claim the right to assume responsibility for the territory's 
treaty relations with other interested states. "69 The Council for 
Namibia's view was in accord on this point. Its representative 
stated that because the United Nations had, pursuant to the 
appropriate General Assembly resolutions, "assumed direct 
responsibility for the territory of Namibia. That country was 
therefore a suigeneris case. in that its predecessor .. . would be the 
United Nations itself. The delegation of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia therefore, hoped that the special case of 
Namibia would be taken into account. "7o 
Indeed, the Conference members recognized that the 
Council for Namibia had long acted as guardian of the interests 
of the Namibian people while South Africa. in violation of 
international law, had continued to occupy and impose upon 
Namibia its apartheid system, already designated a "crime 
against humanity" by the members of the international commu-
nity.71 The Conference then resolved that "South Africa is not the 
predecessor State of the future independent State of Namibia. "72 
Having thus concluded that the Council for Namibia, 
although not a state itself, must, for limited purposes, be seen as 
the predecessor state of a newly-independent Namibia, there 
remains the question as to what this implies insofar as the 
obligations of the new government are concerned. As indicated, 
state succession has effects on rights and obligations in the 
broad areas of treaties and private rights. 
The Obligations of a New Government 
l. Treaties 
Modern treaty law is governed by the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties of 1978 to which the Council for Namibia 
is a signatory. 73 Expressly applicable to a state succession which 
has occurred only after the entry into force of the Convention, it 
is a product of the entrenchment of the right of self-determina-
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uonin the internationaljurisprudentialcorpusin the post-World 
war II ear. 74 Accordingly, it adopts the tabula rasa or clean slate 
doctrine which does not involve rejection of the continuity of 
treaties but implies that the newly-independent state is entitled 
to choose which treaties concluded by its predecessor will be 
regarded as continuing and which will be considered as termi-
nated. 
Under the Vienna Convention. a newly-independent state 
is not "bound to maintain in force, or become a party to. any 
treaty by reason only of the fact that at the date of the succession 
of States the treaty was in force in respect to the territory to which 
the succession relates . "75 A newly-independent state is therefore 
free to choose whether or not to become a party to a multilateral 
treaty. It may establish its status as a contracting state to a 
multilateral treaty which is not in force and, if it does exercise 
those rights. it enjoys all the rights regarding reservations 
enjoyed by the predecessor state. On the other hand. a newly -
independent state succeeds to a bilateral treaty only with the 
express or implicit agreement of the other state party. the effect 
being to constitute direct treaty relations which are independent 
of the fate of treaty relations with the predecessor state. 
The members of the international community recognized 
the necessity of applying the tabula rasa doctrine to an independ -
ent Namibia at the United Nations Conference on Succession of 
States in respect ofTreaties of 1977 and 1978. 76 as well as during 
the Untied Nations Conference on Succession of States in 
Respect of State Property. Archives and Debts of 1983 .77 It was 
the view of the representative of the Council for Namibia that the 
Council 
noted with satisfaction that the International Law Com-
mission had adopted the "clean-slate" principle in accor-
dance with which the newly-independent State had the 
right to decide whether or not it wished to remain a party 
to a treaty concluded by the predecessor State. That 
principle safeguarded the legitimate interest of newly 
independent States and enabled them to reject colonial 
heritages which might prejudice their economy and the 
well -being of their inhabitants. It thus helped to safe-
guard the interest and natural resources ofNamibia ... The 
Council considered that, in the case of Namibia, failure to 
apply the "clean-slate" principle would impose an intol-
erable burden on the territory once it had become inde-
pendent. 78 
The western powers echoed this view. The British repre-
sentative said, for example. that his government "hoped that 
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Namibia, on attaining independence, would be allowed to benefit 
from the application of the "clean-slate" doctrtne. 79 As the 
Director of the United Nations Institute for Namibia put it at the 
opening session of the 1984 Seminar on State Succession to 
Rights and Obligations and Law in Namibia, "any recommenda-
tions on state succession to rights and obligations should aim at 
assisting an independent Namibia to embark on a social, political 
and economic reconstruction programme and exercise the terrt-
torial rights and the right to exploit its wealth unfettered by past 
colonial or any other claims. "80 
Since, as has been demonstrated, South Africa, because 
of its internationally illegal conduct in connection with Namibia 
cannot and should not be seen to be the predecessor state of an 
independent Namibia, any South African treaties, which also 
made themselves applicable to Namibia, must not be viewed as 
proper objects for succession of states. The result is dilferent in 
the case of treaties entered into by the Council for Namibia 
which, for this purpose, must be regarded as the predecessor 
state. These treaties, most of which are multilateral, such as the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, 81 the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 82 the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 83 the Geneva 
Conventions on the Laws ofWar, 84 and the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 85 are proper objects for state succession. A 
new Namibian government may wish to maintain these treaties 
in force because they were entered into by a body which acted as 
a guardian of the interests of the Namibian people and which, in 
addition, received further credibility regarding its dealings by the 
active participation of SWAPO which enjoys wide support in 
Namibia; indeed, both actively participated in the negotiations 
for many of these treaties. 
ll. Private Rights 
In addition to treaties, state succession also impacts 
upon private rights. Whether an independent Namibia will have 
to honor the rights of foreign nationals. particularly foreign 
corporations in that country. should be a matter of grave 
concern. At present the Namibian economy is controlled by 
South African corporations and multinational enterprises. For 
example, a 1985 United Nations study revealed that four multi-
national corporations "account for about 95 percent of the 
territory's mineral production and exports and hold approxi-
mately 89 percent of its mineral assets. "86 Such companies 
operate in Namibia in violation of international law. 
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In its 1971 Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice took the position that 
state members of the United Nations are under 
obligation to recognize the illegality of South 
Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of 
its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia and to 
refrain from any acts and in particular any deal-
ing with the government of South Africa implying 
recognition of the legality of or leading support or 
assistance to such presence and administra-
tion.87 
Also in this vein, in 197 4, the Council for Namibia, acting as the 
legal representative of Namibia promulgated, and the General 
Assembly later endorsed. Decree No. 1 for the Protection of the 
Natural Resources of Namibia. Relevant sections provided that 
1) No person or entity, whether a body corporate 
or unincorporated may search for, prospect for. 
explore for, take extract. mine, process, refine, 
use. sell, export or distribute any natural re-
source whether animal or mineral. situated or 
found to be situated within the territorial limits of 
Namibia without the consent and permission of 
the United Nations Council for Namibia or any 
person authorized to act on its behalf for the 
purpose of giving such permission or such con-
sent: 
2) Any permission. concession or license for all or 
any of the purposes specified in paragraph 1 
above whensoever granted by any person or en-
tity, including any body purporting to act under 
the authority of the Government of the Republic 
of South Africa or the MAdministration of South 
West Africa" or their predecessors, is null, void 
and of no force or effect. 88 
Although the Council hoped to preserve Namibia's wealth for the 
benefit of the Namibian people, the multinational corporations 
ignored the decree. Instead, a 1986 report by a South West 
African Commission of Inquiry known as the Thirion Commis-
sion Report after the Commission's chairman Mr. Justice Thir-
ion, revealed that the multinationals, fearful of the prospect that 
Namibia would one day become independent. had adopted 
methods geared toward extracting the most from the mines in the 
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short term without regard for the mines· longevity .89 Given the 
reality of over-exploitation coupled with the fact that since 1966 
when the General Assembly revoked South Africa's mandate ove; 
Namibia. all such dealings have been illegal. it would appear 
logical that an independent Namibia would wish to apply the 
clean slate doctrine with regard to its dealings with private 
concerns. Here. however. there is much international law to the 
contrary although it must be pointed out that this law was made 
by western states desirous of protecting the business interests of 
their nationals. 
When a new state comes into being. the private 
property rights of those living or doing business there do not 
necessarily lapse. In terms of the actions a successor state can 
take. there is a distinction between the rights of nationals of the 
new state and of foreign nationals . As far as nationals of the new 
state are concerned, the government may freely appropriate their 
property. subject perhaps only to constraints placed upon it by 
international human rights treaties which it may have chosen to 
succeed to or to become party to. The rule is dilf erent in the case 
of foreign nationals. There, the new state must undertake the 
expropriation for a public purpose and must give appropriate 
compensation. As the Permanent Court of International Justice 
suggested in 1923, "Private rights acquired under existing law do 
not cease on a change of sovereignty. "90 
While such rules remain in the international legal 
corpus. most of the so-called Third World countries do not accept 
them. Although they often recognize that these western rules are 
appropriate with regard to investments made in the post-inde-
pendence era. they insist that for the period prior to independ-
ence when they were unable to protect their interests. any 
agreements entered into by the predecessor state were exploitive 
and unequal. While this reasoning seems particularly logical in 
the case of Namibia where the predecessor state. the Council. 
with the weight of international law behind it. recognized as 
illegal the South African approved Namibian investments of 
multinational corporations. an argument can be made for 
Namibia's adherence to the western rules. 
With its economy so heavily dependent upon extrac-
tion, an independent Namibia will undoubtedly seek to diversity 
its economy and encourage the development of local manufac-
turing. Presumably such manufacturing could be established 
with the help of foreign investors. bearing in mind that it 
behooves the new government to establish a sound investment 
policy. Such a policy should ensure that each enterprise has a 
certain percentage of Namibian participation and also require 
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that f1.n11s establish social welfare programs in areas such as 
education. health, and career development for employees and 
their families. This will not occur if, by nationalizing the currently 
operating multinational corporations, the new Namibian govern -
ment succeeds in alienating foreign investors . 
At the same time, it is also true that those multination-
als responsible for the depletion of Namibian resources should be 
made to make reparations for their misdeeds. In this case, 
negotiations conducted with the utmost diplomacy may succeed 
in securing an infusion of currency and know how not only from 
the multinationals themselves but also from the governments of 
their home countries which may be unwilling to be branded as 
crude exploiters in various international fora . For a new Namib -
ian government faced with overwhelming economic and social 
problems , cooperation and not confrontation may be the wisest 
path. 
conclusion 
The question of Namibian independence has long 
attracted the attention of the international community. After two 
decades of wrangling with South Africa over its occupation of 
Namibia , the General Assembly, in 1966, revoked South Africa's 
mandate over the territory . South Africa, however, still remained. 
Meanwhile , SWAPO, which after some years of fruitless peaceful 
protests had begun the armed struggle in an effort to dislodge 
South Africa, garnered an increasing amount of international 
support . It eventually gained U.N. recognition as the official 
representative of the Namibian people but stopped short of 
declaring itself a government -in-exile. Rather. it has remained a 
would -be -government working closely with the U.N. Council for 
Namibia which the international body recognizes as Namibia's 
legal administering authority. In this capacity, the Council has 
entered into many international agreements on behalf of Na-
mibia. 
In mid-1989, as Namibia appears to be on the verge of 
becoming independent. it behooves those concerned with the 
legal obligations of the future polity to consider the problem of 
succession of states , particularly with regard to international 
treaties and private rights. Analysis reveals that South Africa . 
because of its years of occupation in contravention of interna -
tional law , is not the predecessor state of an independent 
Namibia. Rather, that distinction goes to the Council for Namibia 
which. although not a state according to traditional legal require-
ments, has enjoyed a unique legal status. Hence, a new Namib-
ian government. whether controlled by SWAPO or not, may wish 
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to maintain in force any treaties entered into by the Council. At 
the same time, the new government would do well to honor the 
rights of foreign nationals in Namibia such as those eng aged in 
the exploitation of natural resources even though these ac UVities 
have been illegal since 1966. If the new government fails to give 
adequate compensation in instances where it expropriat es the 
property of these foreign nationals for public purposes, it Will, no 
doubt. discourage the very foreign investment it will h ope to 
attract to diversity Namibia's economy. 
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